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ABSTRACT
Nicholas Lafayette Pyeatt
More than an Uphill Battle: Primary Challenges to Congressional Incumbents
(Under the direction of Erik Engstrom)
This paper is an examination into the district factors and representative characteristics 
that lead to challenges of incumbent House members in party primaries. Given the extreme 
difficulty in defeating incumbent House members, it is expected that rational political actors will 
gauge the political climate carefully. Partisan dominated districts will be more likely to be the 
site of inter-party battles as the seats will be of greater value to potential challengers. Members 
that moderate their views will be more likely to be challenged due to the relative ideological 
extremity of the respective partisan base.  
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This paper is dedicated in loving memory to my grandmother, Dorothy Fagg. She was a 
person of intelligence, courage, patience and seemingly limitless compassion. Faith, family and 
friends were the most important things in her life and she will be missed. 
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“If one’s goal is electoral success, it is not rational to challenge an incumbent.”
Louis Sandy Maisel, From Obscurity to Oblivion
INTRODUCTION
While the political science literature on congressional elections is vast and deep, much 
of it starts from a fundamental misconception. Rather than beginning from the point of 
candidate emergence, it begins and ends with the general election. This approach gains the 
discipline a number of valuable insights, but it neglects the fact that candidates face 
another potential pitfall on the path to election or reelection, that of the partisan primary.
While the primary is the comparatively understudied cousin of the general election, it 
has the potential to explain much about candidate behavior. Especially, in the modern 
political climate as the number of competitive general election congressional contests is 
comparatively small, generally numbering less than 50, the primary is frequently the locus
of electoral action and strategic behavior (Fowler and McClure, 1989). Every year, 
congressmen face challengers in the primary, generally with a few incumbents being 
defeated. Such challenges are inherently risky, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
most political actors will consider the political environment carefully before entering 
against a sitting member. Examining the conditions in which in-party challengers emerge
should offer insight into what cues challengers use to identify vulnerable incumbents. 
Since there exists a fundamental difference between candidates that choose to challenge an 
2incumbent of their own party, versus an incumbent of the opposing party, this paper seeks 
to isolate some of the contextual factors that might influence such a candidacy.
Primary Structure
The modern direct primary is an addition to our electoral system rather than an 
institutional feature designed by the founding fathers. It was established by the Progressive 
Movement in the early part of this century as a method of weakening the power of the 
‘party bosses’ and preventing them from nominating their own candidates (Jacobson, 
1983). This reform makes the United States’ electoral system unique among established 
democracies, because it is standard for parties to internally control the candidate
nomination process. Key argues that the weakness of American political parties created the 
primary and it has served to weaken them further (1956; also Galderisi and Ginsberg, 
1986). 
Organized state-run primaries create a political environment for the public competition 
of factions within the major parties. Primaries thus prevent the complete dominance of an 
area by a small group of party elites, by allowing some competition in even the most party-
dominated areas (Key; Jewell and Olsen, 1982; for a different view see Turner, 1953). 
Epstein argues that the primary system delayed the development of a two party system in 
party-dominated areas, such as the Democratic South and Republican Wisconsin, by 
allowing a level of intra-party competition (1986). He also believes that this nominating 
system had the effect of weakening the power of third parties because it allowed for the 
competition of less popular ideologies, incorporating them into a broad two party system 
(also Galderisi and Ginsberg). Under this structure, the parties become in effect ‘public 
utilities’ of the state because it plays a role in their promotion and internal competition. 
3While the primary is nationally the principle nominating procedure, the process is not
uniform; there exists a wide variety of state-specific forms. In 2001, seventeen states had
either a legal or informal nomination of candidates at a pre-primary party convention 
(Galderisi and Ezra). Nine states’ conventions have authority over which candidates make 
the final ballot (CO, CT, IA, NM, NY, ND, RI, UT and VA). For example in Connecticut,
primary candidates must receive a minimum of 20% of the votes at convention in order to 
make it on to the primary ballot. In Utah, only endorsed candidates are allowed on the 
ballot, but the party must select two candidates if no candidate receives more than 70% of 
the convention vote. Jewell sees the rise in states using convention endorsement as a 
reaction to their perceived loss of nominating power (1984). 
Both convention endorsements and nominations have the effect of lowering the number 
of possible primary candidates, with endorsements, especially, hurting those without large 
bases of support (Hernnson and Gimpel, 1995). Endorsed candidates may still face 
challengers in the primary, but, Bibby finds that they face generally fewer, less qualified 
opponents (2000). Generally, whether or not the endorsed candidate prevails relates to the 
organizational strength and unity of the party (Jewell). Even with the party’s official 
backing, they do not universally succeed, with a large amount of variation by state and 
party. For example, Bibby found that endorsed candidates in Minnesota and Rhode Island 
face far more difficult primary contests than in most other states. 
Additionally, the state has the ability to limit the number of candidates through ballot 
restrictions. New York, for example, requires roughly 20,000 signatures to be placed on 
the ballot and they must be on pink paper, signed legibly, exactly as they appear on the 
voter roll (Galderisi and Ginsburg). By placing large barriers between potential candidates 
4and the voters these authors believe that strict ballot access laws diminish the importance 
of primary elections.  
Most states organize their primaries under either an open or closed primary system. In 
an open primary, individuals may choose to vote in either party primary on election day. 
Texas is one example of such a state, no party pre-registration is required to vote in the 
primary. A closed primary is exactly as it sounds, a party’s primary is ‘closed’ to all those 
who have not previously registered. A small number of states use a nominating system 
referred to as the ‘blanket primary’. Under this system, a voter may choose a candidate of 
either party for each office. This procedure has been used in Washington and Alaska for a 
long time, and it has recently been adopted in California (Maisel, 1987). Louisiana uses a 
somewhat similar system sometimes referred to as the ‘open primary’ or the ‘nonpartisan 
primary’ (see Kuzenski, 1997). Under this peculiar system, all candidates run on a 
common ballot and voters are allowed to vote for a candidate of either party. The 
Louisiana primary system is majority-rule and if a candidate receives more than 50% of the 
vote, there is no general election for that race. If no candidate receives a majority, the top 
two vote-getters, regardless of party, face each other in a run-off election. As a result, two 
candidates of the same political party frequently face each other in the run-off election. In 
contrast, the more typical ‘blanket primary’ system usually results in a general election 
contest between candidates of both major parties.
General Election Effects
Fearing that a primary contest may weaken party unity in the general election, 
candidates and party elites are generally concerned about the possibility of contested 
primaries. Trying to isolate the effect of primaries has led to a contentious debate among 
5academics. Changes in methodology, control variables, state selection and duration seem 
to play a large role in the divergent results. Hacker found, in one of the first articles on the 
subject, that divisive primaries had little effect on Senate and Governor elections (1965). 
Ten years later, Pierson and Smith replicated that result, even when controlling for 
incumbent effects and level of state party competition (1975). Born, looking at House 
candidates, found that divisive primaries had a limited impact on the final election 
outcome (1981; see also Kenney, 1988). Galderisi et al argue more theoretically that 
primaries can either damage an incumbent or play no role in the final outcome, i.e. they 
can never help an incumbent (2001). 
Incumbents and Challengers
Since primaries are fundamentally different than general elections, they pose a different 
set of concerns for incumbents. When preparing for a general election, an office holder 
must present an acceptable record to the majority of voters in the district. Specifically, for 
a primary, an incumbent needs a record acceptable to a smaller, more ideological part of 
the district (Galderisi et all, 2001). The need to face the electorate twice poses difficulties 
for incumbents and requires them to be proactive. For instance, incumbents can raise a 
large war chest in order to try to ward off potential challengers (Herrnson, 2004). This 
exemplifies Cox and Katz’s argument that the ability to frighten off potential quality 
challengers is one of the main benefits of incumbency (1996). While their research focused 
on general elections, its extension to potential primary contests is intuitive.
Luckily for incumbents, primary contests are relatively rare. Grau found that incumbents 
were far less likely than non-incumbents to face primary challengers (1981). The most 
action in primaries occurs in competitions for open seats (Maisel, 1987). Challengers most 
6likely arise in partisan dominated districts and, even then, generally only when the 
incumbent is viewed as vulnerable (Grau; Galderisi et all, 2001; Goodliffe and Magleby, 
2001; Bibby). Because they are seen as having a higher value, nominations for safe party 
seats are generally more competitive (Maisel). Turner believes that intra-party competition 
occurs more frequently in areas where party dominance is statewide rather than focused on 
single area (1953). Schantz found, in 1980, that primary opponents were far more likely for 
Democrats than Republicans (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; similar results, state legislative 
races Grau; contrasting view Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971). Herrnson and Gimpel 
replicated that finding, they believe that result stemmed from the Democrats deeper 
candidate pool at the state level and their more diverse electoral coalition (1995). They also 
found a regional effect for the Democrats, with fewer primaries fought in the South and the 
West, and no change in the number in the Northeast. Finally, they also discovered 
Democrats were more likely to challenge incumbents, while Republicans were more likely 
to react to the partisan nature of the district and state political opportunities. In general, 
Fowler and McClure believe that primaries are becoming more competitive, especially in 
the Democratic Party (1989). 
How often do incumbents lose in their primary? The easy answer is not very often. 
Bibby, looking at all congressional races between 1980 and 1998, found that roughly 
98.7% of incumbents have been re-nominated. That is not to imply that incumbents are 
never challenged. Looking at races between 1994 and 1998, Maisel and Stone found that at 
least one-quarter of incumbents faced contested nominations (2001). Parsing out the 
unqualified candidates, at least 10% of incumbents faced a quality challenger in each 
election. As for defeated members, that number is highly variable. In 1992, nineteen
7incumbent members were defeated for their primary nomination and from 1946 to 1998 an 
average of roughly seven members have failed to be re-nominated (Goodliffe and 
Magleby). It is important to look not just at the number of members defeated in the 
primary, but also the percentage of total defeated incumbents. That number is also highly 
variable, looking at 1980-1996, that percentage has ranged from a low of 6.3% in 1990 to a 
high 44% in 1992 (Ornstein et all, 1998). Clearly, incumbents cannot afford to be 
complacent about their nomination.
Since knocking off a same-party incumbent is relatively rare, it is somewhat surprising 
that congressmen are regularly challenged for their nomination. Jacobson and Kernell 
argue that candidates are strategic, thus they will seek out conditions when victory is most 
likely (1983; also Maisel and Stone, 1980). Along similar lines, candidates may look at  the 
situation both objectively (considering fundraising, partisan nature of the district, etc.) and 
subjectively (personal reasons, ideology, etc.) (Maisel et all, 1990). Strategy will only take 
a challenger so far; Maisel notes that most of those times when an incumbent loses there is 
a powerful factor leading to that outcome (1987). Huckshorn and Spencer argue that 
because winning a primary (whether against an incumbent or not) adds cost to the election 
equation, most potential candidates would seek to avoid one. If they chose to challenge an 
incumbent, then ideology would be a likely motivating factor. According to their research, 
half of the primary challengers interviewed identified ideology as their major reason for 
seeking office. 
Incumbent strength clearly deters potential candidates, especially quality candidates and 
this serves to limit competition (Maisel and Stone; Kazee, 1983). Increases in challenger 
quality have the potential to alter outcomes, Herrnson argues that more qualified 
8candidates leads to more competitive elections (2001; Jacobson and Kernell). 
Unfortunately, political observers frequently evaluate the quality of candidates by their 
ability to raise money or fund their own campaigns. Successful primary challengers likely
spend large amounts of their own money, in an effort to increase their identification with 
the public and, thus reducing the incumbency advantage (Goodliffe and Magleby; Maisel, 
1982; Jewell, 1984). Critical to the success of a primary challenge is access to campaign 
funds; winning challengers generally spend more than losing ones.  Even if they have 
selected their race strategically, challengers still face tall odds. In Maisel’s study of 
primary candidates, he found that one-quarter, even those not facing an incumbent, did not 
feel that they were likely to win (1982). Most candidates in the interviews ran either 
because they felt like it was the best time or that a certain issue was being ignored. 
Maisel lists certain factors that can improve the chances for challengers. First, an 
incumbent misstep can be critical (1982).  Second, in order to prevent division in the anti-
incumbent vote, Maisel argues for the necessity of a small primary field. Third, access to 
campaign funds is critical, whether from personal sources or from donors. Fourth, strength
in a geographic area is an asset. Finally, since congressional primaries are generally low 
salience campaigns, especially when higher offices are on the ballot, it is vital to grab the 
public’s attention. 
District and incumbent factors will also play a key role in the possibilities for challenger 
success and emergence. Krasno and Green found that local political factors were most 
important in the emergence of quality House challengers (1988). Both the size of previous 
election victory and scandal both have the potential to add an insurgent primary candidate. 
Maisel and Stone pose that how well an incumbent’s ideology fits with the district, their 
9tenure, demographic characteristics, fundraising ability and partisan organizations may 
play a role in the outcome and the emergence of candidates. Generally, they believe that 
the candidate is more likely to be concerned about their chances of winning the nomination 
than in the general election. Clearly, the nomination is not the ultimate goal, except for 
protest candidates, but it must be considered the proximate one. 
THEORY
Types of Candidates
When formulating a theory of primary challenger emergence it is important to start by 
separating out the three broad types of candidates: qualified, symbolic and protest. These 
types must be kept distinct because the goals and strategies involved are fundamentally 
different. Qualified candidates are those candidates with a genuine chance of winning the 
election. While their prior backgrounds could be very different; elected official, prominent 
businessman, teacher, etc., their goal of winning the nomination and ultimately the general 
election unifies them. These candidates may view weakness in the current office holder 
and seek to avoid the inevitable crowded open seat primary.* Symbolic candidates are 
those that generally represent an ideological or demographic position not shared by the 
current representative. It is most likely that in Democratic districts these candidates will 
come from the left and similarly in Republican districts come from the right. These 
candidates might want to win, yet fundamentally they are more concerned with raising the 
importance of their issue or group. On occasion these candidates get elected but, in 
general, they do not defeat an incumbent in the primary. Finally, protest candidates are 
those candidates that are not serious at all, neither posing a serious chance of winning nor 
*For example, in 2000 the average open seat contest had over four candidates running in the previous office 
holding party’s primary, with some districts having almost a dozen candidates. 
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reflecting a broad portion of the electorate. Generally, these candidates are perennial 
candidates for some office or another, running regularly without showing any electoral 
traction. While for most of this study symbolic and protest candidates can  be thought of 
together, due to the similarity of the goals (i.e. making a stand, not necessarily winning), it 
is important to keep them generally theoretically separate. 
Goals: Winning (Quality Candidates)
Quality candidates will be most likely to challenge when they think that the incumbent 
is vulnerable for one reason or another. Within the arena of party primaries, the chief forms 
of weakness will be electoral and institutional. Since these are serious challengers, they 
will be putting time and other resources into the campaign and will not want to squander 
them. These challengers should be surveying the landscape carefully for the perfect 
opening. 
Hypothesis 1: Primary challengers will be more likely when an incumbent looks 
electorally weak.
Hypothesis 2: Primary challengers will be more likely when the incumbent is 
facing a current scandal.
Hypothesis 3: Primary challengers will be more likely when the incumbent has 
shown a level of institutional weakness. 
Hypothesis 4: Primary challengers will be more likely in partisan dominated 
districts (i.e. safe seats)
Hypothesis 5: Primary challengers will be more likely following a redrawing of 
district boundaries that brings in a large number of new voters. 
All four hypotheses are examples of candidates reading the district and trying to evaluate 
their chances. The first three hypotheses refer to the electoral weaknesses of the 
incumbent; deficiencies or possible deficiencies in previous or future election returns. 
Hypothesis 3 specifically refers to the possibility of criticizing an incumbent for a lack of 
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institutional prowess, which would reflect poorly on their ability to deliver for the district.
Hypothesis 4 reflects both the electoral concerns of the challenger and the value of the seat. 
A ‘safe’ seat is easier to defend in a general election and therefore will be of greater overall 
value. A strategic elite will recognize that defeating an incumbent will require a significant 
amount of resources and logically they will be less likely to challenge if a competitive 
general election battle is to follow. For example, looking at the 2000 election, the average 
open seat winner won by less than half the margin of the previous incumbent (22% versus 
46%). Therefore a strategic elite facing an incumbent cannot expect the same level of 
support as the current incumbent. Running in seat with a stronger partisan advantage 
reduces the cost of the already uphill campaign.  According to Hypothesis 5, incumbents 
will lose some of their strategic advantage following a redistricting plan that significantly 
changes the district’s boundaries by adding new voters. An incumbent will have to work 
hard to gain the name recognition in the new part of the district and this may provide an 
opening for a challenger. 
Goals: Taking a Stand (Symbolic and Protest Candidates)
Challenging an incumbent is always a difficult proposition with small potential for 
victory. For symbolic and protest candidates, facing an incumbent is not merely about 
winning rather, these candidates place greater importance on raising the visibility of their 
group or issue. Accordingly, they will place less stake in contextual factors that might 
effect their chances.
Hypothesis 5: Primary challengers will be more likely when the incumbent does 
not live in the most populace part of the district. 
Hypothesis 6: Primary challengers will be likely when the incumbent is more 
ideologically moderate than the primary electorate. 
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Both hypotheses 5 and 6 refer to the incumbent’s ability to represent the district. Many 
districts, due to their size, may have conflict s between the different geographic sections. 
Hypothesis 5 seeks to test whether representing a district from one of the less populace 
areas, leads to the emergence of a symbolic challenger. Hypothesis 6 stems from the fact 
the primary electorate is generally more ideological extreme than the general election 
electorate. Therefore, as an incumbent moderates, they should be more likely to face 
challengers, specifically from the ideological extremes of their party. This hypothesis may 
prove to be true for all three types of challengers but qualified candidates will likely need 
to see a larger electoral opening than merely a slight move to the center by the incumbent. 
Some Common Deterrents
While the mental equation for both sets of candidates is different, some common 
incumbent traits should influence candidate emergence.
Hypothesis 7: Primary challengers will be less likely as the incumbent ages or 
serves more terms. 
Hypothesis 8: Primary challengers will be less likely as the incumbent raises 
more money. 
Hypothesis 9: Primary challengers will be more likely in the Republican Party 
than the Democratic Party. 
As a candidate ages the likelihood of retirement increases, which will eventually result in 
an open seat. Therefore, it is logical that older candidates should face fewer challengers 
because their seat will become open sooner. The second part of Hypothesis 7 refers to fact 
that more tenured members will have a longer history of electoral success. The longer the 
successful electoral history, the less likely it becomes that the incumbent will make a 
strategic misstep large enough for primary defeat. Hypothesis 8 refers to one of an 
incumbent’s most ready tools for frightening off potential challengers: money. Hypothesis 
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9, which runs counter to much of the existing literature, is reasoned that a Republican seat 
is currently more valuable because of their majority status. Theoretically, all three of these 
hypotheses should be more influential for quality challengers than the symbolic group. In 
order to test that fact, a second set of tests will be performed to isolate the differences in 
that group. 
DATA
The scope of this paper is all 2000 and 2002 congressional primary elections. I selected 
those years because I wanted to include results from a presidential election year, an off 
year and a redistricting year. The selection of those two years allowed me to cover all three 
of those broad categories. Each case is an individual district (or an incumbent, depending 
on one’s perspective) but the sample had to be reduced from 870 to 767 for two reasons. 
First, open seats were omitted, because they did not have an incumbent running and would 
present unique characteristics, which are widely studied in the literature. Second, three
independents were running for reelection and had to be eliminated because they were not 
constrained by the normal direct primary. The data was coded by the author and can be 
produced by request. 
Candidate name, party, terms, age, state, percentage presidential vote, committee status
and district number were all gathered by using the National Journal’s Almanac of 
American Politics. Previous incumbent vote percentages and the number of primary 
challengers were collected from the America Votes series with The Almanac used as a 
backup. In those cases where the two sources conflicted, America Votes was used to make
the final decision. The amounts of money raised by the incumbent and challengers were
gathered from the Federal Election Commission website. The Almanac provided the 
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incumbent’s hometown, while the Congressional Districts in the 1990s and Congressional 
Districts in the 2000s provided the counties in each district and their population. In order to 
find out which county a city was in, the Census’s Quick Facts webpage was used. The 
ideological data was from the DW-NOMINATE scores from Keith Poole’s website. 
Partisan strength was measured by using Cook’s PVI (Partisan Voting Index), which is 
calculated based upon each district’s difference in presidential vote from the national 
average. Scandal was collected from Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s report on the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. Redistricting data came from Michael 
Crespin’s measure of redistricting change.  
MEASUREMENT
The dependent variable will be two different measures of the number of the primary 
challengers. In the first analysis, the variable will be a simple count of the number of 
challengers. In the second analysis, the number of challengers will be reduced by looking 
only at quality challengers. This variable will be made dichotomous since there were only 
three districts with more than one quality challenger.† Quality challengers will be defined 
as those that raised at least ten percent as much money as the incumbent. This measure is 
not ideal because it does not get at the motivation of candidates, but it should serve as a 
safe threshold for determining candidate quality. It is difficult to imagine that a quality 
challenger could not raise at least ten percent as much as an incumbent, while it is unlikely 
that a protest candidate could pass that threshold.‡
†
 This finding reinforces the view from Maisel that quality challengers are unlikely to join a race with other 
quality challengers. A race against an incumbent is an uphill one from the beginning, so following another 
serious challenger would not be a logical action. 
‡
 The data seems to reinforce the ten percent threshold. The distribution of challenger fundraising resembles 
half of a standard normal distribution, with a majority of challengers raising no money at all. There is a 
natural trough between eight and fifteen percent, with a very small number raising more than fifteen percent. 
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A Note on the Number of Candidates
One might reasonably believe that coding the number of primary challengers would be a 
straightforward process. I had originally planned to use the FEC website as a source for all 
primary candidates, both those that actually ran and the ones that considered running. 
Instead, I found a large number of former candidates still filing FEC reports and confusing 
the process. Additionally, I found a large number of candidates that were reasonably 
electorally successful challengers who filed no forms at all. There were also a significant 
number of times where the number of challengers in America Votes conflicted with The 
Almanac. While America Votes was finally chosen as the arbiter of disputes, there may be 
a small amount of measurement error on the dependent variable. Luckily that error will be 
almost exclusively focused on the most fringe of fringe candidates. Here is a quick sample
of some of the curious findings that made this portion of the coding much more interesting.
1) In NY 9, an individual challenged and lost to the Democratic incumbent in the primary 
and then faced him in the general election as a Republican.
2) In NY10, a losing Democratic primary candidate faces the incumbent in the general 
election as a Liberal Party candidate.  
3) In NC 4, a challenger got 11% of the vote yet filed no FEC forms. 
4) In OR 3, a challenger got 12% of the vote while filing no forms
5) In TX 1, a challenger got 15% of the vote while filing no FEC forms. 
In order to measure the electoral strength of a member, it is important to quantify how 
much better a member does than the average member of their party. In order to do this, I 
have created a modified version of the ‘normal vote’ and ‘personal vote’ (Ansolabehere et 
Attempting to fully replicate Jacobsen’s measure of quality by previously held office, proved difficult, but 
where information was available, it produced comparable results. It is likely that this measure casts a slightly 
wider net than that measure, also including a small number of self-funded challengers. 
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all, 2000). I measured the ‘normal vote’ by taking the partisan totals for the most recent 
presidential election. I had intended to include a percentage of partisans in the district, but 
unfortunately the data was not available for enough states to warrant usage. The ‘personal 
vote’ was measured as the difference between the incumbent’s previous general election 
percentage and the normal vote. For members that received a smaller percentage than the 
‘normal vote’, they were coded as zero, having no ‘personal vote’ (132 members in all). 
To measure the partisan strength of the district, I used Cook’s PVI measure. Institutional 
weakness was measured with a dichotomous variable reflecting whether or not a member 
was on a power committee.  The member’s residency will be measured by a dichotomous 
variable reflecting whether or not they live in the most populace county in the district. This 
variable is somewhat simplistic as some districts contain two counties of similar 
populations and therefore the distinction is less theoretically important. Nonetheless, for 
consistency the variable was coded the same way even if one county was less than one 
percent larger than another. One note, a small number of members live in towns small 
enough I was unable to identify their counties. 
The ideological difference from the primary electorate proved to be a difficult item to 
measure. In the end, I settled on an imperfect but practical method, the absolute value of 
the DW-NOMINATE score. This method does not attempt to measure the specific 
ideology of the district; rather, it simply measures the ideology of each member, as 
compared to other members and places them in a single direction. Since moderation is 
measured by lower numbers and extremity by higher numbers, its value is predicted to be 
negative. 
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Age was measured in a simple chronological fashion. Tenure was measured in number 
of terms served before the election; for those members that were elected in a special 
election that part of a term is measured as one. For example, a member elected in the 1998 
general election and a 1999 special election would both be coded as serving one term in 
2000. Party was operationalized in a simple dichotomous fashion, with Republican 
arbitrarily receiving the higher value. 
Finally, two control variables were created to handle the difference in ballot access. The 
first one isolates those states where political party conventions have a significant influence 
on which candidates make the final ballot. These rules should logically have an effect on 
the number, as well as the quality of candidates. The second one isolates those states that 
have a blanket primary. While there is less theoretical reasoning to assume that blanket 
primaries encourage or discourage candidates, I believe it is important to separate out this 
unique nominating process.  
Redistricting was coded using the valuable measure of district change created by 
Michael Crespin. Districts were coded based upon the percentage of ‘retained’ constituents 
following the census. Therefore members with a smaller percentage of ‘old’ constituents 
will be predicted to have a greater chance of facing a primary challenger. 
A Note on Scandal
While theoretically and empirically I believe that scandal, or appearance of scandal, 
would play a role in the possible emergence of a primary challenger, I found it difficult to 
operationalize. The ideal method would be to conduct a content analysis of the primary 
newspaper in each member’s district but the difficulty of such an undertaking is obvious. 
In the end I chose to use the Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s report on the 
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investigations of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. All members 
who were investigated, regardless of the final result, were coded as having scandal. This 
measure, while systematic, probably underestimates the number of members that were 
accused of a scandal by a primary opponent. 
ANALYSIS
Before running the model it is important to look at the number of primary challengers. 
Table 1 shows that just under 25% of incumbents faced a challenger in 2000. 
Table 1: Number of Primary Challengers
Number Percentage (Frequency)
0 78.72 (614)
1 16.67 (130)
2  3.72  (29)
3  0.64  (5)
5  0.26 (2)
Totals 100 (780)
A majority of those challengers were not credible by any measure of quality. Using the ten 
percent standard, Table 2 shows that far fewer faced quality challengers, roughly 5% of 
total members. Despite those relatively small numbers, these are the cases were the 
greatest amount of strategic behavior should be observed.
 Table 2:Number of Quality Primary Challengers
Number Percentage (Frequency)
0 95.13 (742)
1 4.49 (35)
2 0.38 (3)
Totals 100(780)
Given the first dependent variable is a count, it would be methodologically best to run it 
either as a Poisson or negative binomial regression. The dependent variable includes a 
large number of zeros therefore, it suffers from over-dispersion. Poisson assumes that the 
mean and the variance will be the same, which was not true in this case. Therefore, I 
elected to use a negative binomial model (which relaxes the previous assumption) with 
19
clustered standard errors on the state variable because it is theoretically likely that state has 
some effect on the number of challengers.§ I originally ran the model with a dummy 
variable for each state, but it did not change the results and needlessly ate up degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 3: Count Model: Number of Primary Challengers 2000 and 2002 elections
Variable Basic Model
Coefficient (Robust S.E.)
Party/Majority -.08(.21)
Residence -.17(.16)
Terms -.01(.02)
Ideological Extremity -1.58(.52)***
Power Committee -.06(.14)
Money Raised -.00(.00)
Age -.01(.01)
Personal Vote -.01(.01)
Partisan Strength    .04(.01)***
Ballot Restrictive State -.79(.27)***
Blanket Primary State     .07(.13)
Redistricting -.01(.00)*
Scandal    .84(.46)*
Constant    .46(.65)
N 767
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
As you can see from Table 3, ideology of the member seems to have a powerful effect 
on possibility of facing a primary challenger. As a member becomes more ideologically 
extreme, the possibility of facing a primary challenger goes down. Also, as the district 
becomes more partisan-dominated the chance of a primary challenger increases, thus 
partisan strength of the district also has an effect on the number of primary challengers.
This is a fully logical result as a ‘safe seat’ would have added value for a potential 
challenger. 
§
 Also considered was a zero inflated negative binomial model. This model was rejected for two fundamental 
reasons a) the fact that I do not theoretically believe that there two operating processes, one creating zeros 
and one creating higher counts and b) the impossibility of creating the perfect model specification, on which 
the model is highly dependent.  
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Living in one of the nine states where political parties have strong control over ballot 
access, notably decreases the chances of facing a primary challenger. Since parties are 
wary of party challengers, they will act in a concerted way to avoid frivolous challenges to 
existing incumbents. There is a weak negative effect for the redistricting variable, meaning 
that when a congressman retains more of their district following redistricting, they are less 
likely to face a challenger. A weak effect is also found for the presence of scandal or 
potential scandal. The underwhelming result of this variable may be related to this model,
which includes all challengers regardless of quality. While quality challengers should
evaluate the political landscape very carefully, symbolic and protest challengers will be 
less likely to weigh factors such as scandal highly. Since this model includes both types of 
challengers, and non-quality challengers make up the majority of cases, the effects of 
contextual factors, such as scandal, may be muted. 
The difficulty with negative binomial models, like all maximum likelihood models, is 
they do not generate fundamentally intuitive coefficients, since there is not a linear 
relationship. Table 4 presents the change in probably of facing an additional challenger 
based upon a discrete change (in this table moving from the minimum to the maximum and 
moving from zero to one) in the dependent variable. Generally speaking, the measure is 
computed holding all other values to their means. In this analysis, since a number of the 
predictors are dichotomous using the mean in all cases would be illogical. The binary 
predictors have been set to their minimums (iteration 1) and maximums (iteration 2) to aid 
in clarity.
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Table 4: Discrete Change (Count Model)
Variable Iteration 1 
(Min-Max)
Iteration 1 
(0-1)
Iteration 2 
(Min-Max)
Iteration 2 
(0-1)
Party/Majori
ty
-.023 -.025 -.020 -.022
Residence -.045 -.054 -.044 -.053
Terms -.031 -.002 -.025 -.001
Ideological 
Extremity
-.476 -.440 -.392 -.363
Power 
Committee
-.016 -.016 -.014 -.014
Money 
Raised
-.048 -.000 -.040 -.000
Age -.078 -.002 -.064 -.002
Personal 
Vote
-.142 -.003 -.117 -.003
Partisan 
Strength
1.007 .008  .830 .007
Ballot 
Restrictive 
State
-.155 -.155 -.282 -.282
Blanket 
Primary 
State
.021 .021  .016  .016
Redistricting -.240 -.004 -.198 -.004
Scandal .375 .375  .133  .133
N 767 767 767 767
Discrete change was computed with continuous variables held to their 
means, while all dichotomous variables were held to their minimum 
(iteration 1) or maximum (iteration 2) values. Dichotomous variables are 
listed in italics for reader convenience.
Focusing only on the variables that were statistically significant in the previous analysis, 
it will now be possible to compare impacts. Ideological extremity ranges from -.363 to -
.476 suggesting a fairly powerful negative effect, therefore, as a member moves from the 
center to the extreme, the probability that they face a challenger goes down. The close 
range of these values stems from the relatively short range of the predictor (0 to 1.24), so 
the difference from moving from the minimum to the maximum and zero to one is largely 
equivalent. Partisan strength has a very powerful effect on the chances of facing a
challenger with an effect of roughly one in both iterations. The range of the partisan 
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strength variable is much wider (roughly 67) leading to difference between the two types 
of changes estimates. 
Looking at the ballot restrictive state variable, the effect is -.155 in the first iteration and 
-.282 is the second iteration. The effect of living in a ballot restrictive state is less powerful 
than moving to the political extreme and far less powerful than the effect of running in a 
partisan dominated district. The variable is dichotomous leading to the same result between 
the two change estimates. 
Among the two borderline variables, redistricting and scandal, the effects are again 
much lower than partisan strength and ideological extremity. Preserving more of a district, 
does serve to suppress the likelihood of in-party challenges. Scandal increases the 
probability of facing a challenger, but nowhere near the extent of living in a partisan 
dominated district.
Discrete change is not the only way to interpret coefficients from a maximum likelihood 
model. Another common method is to transform the odd ratios into a percent change. This 
will allow you to compare effects against each other. Looking at table 5, we see the strong 
effect of ideological extremity measure. Partisan strength looks less important in this 
analysis but that is an artifact of the relatively wide range of the variable. Scandal shows a 
large effect, but given the lack of statistical significance its impact is uncertain. 
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Table 5: Percent Change in Odds Ratio (Count 
Model)
Variable Percent Change
Party/Majority -8%
Residence -16%
Terms -0.5%
Ideological Extremity -79.4%
Power Committee -5.7%
Money Raised -0.0%
Age -0.5%
Personal Vote -1%
Partisan Strength      3.9%
Ballot Restrictive State -54.7%
Blanket Primary State       7.4%
Redistricting -0.8%
Scandal    132.4%
N 767
Model fit is not as neat a subject in maximum likelihood models as in linear models but 
there are a variety of somewhat imperfect measures. Looking at table 6, it is clear that the 
model does not do an excellent job of predicting the possibility of facing challengers. 
While some of the predictors have gained traction on the times in which primary 
challengers will emerge, it obviously does not show the entire picture. 
Table 6: Model Fit: All Challengers (Count Model)
McFadden’s R2 0.044
Likelihood Ration R2 0.055
Aldrich-Nelson R2 0.054
Wald Test R2 0.077
One could easily argue that a count model is not necessarily the best way to evaluate the 
possibility of facing a primary opponent. Instead, it would be better to test a logistic model 
for the probability of facing a challenger. However, logistic models suffer from the 
assumption that the mean of the dependent variable will 0.5, an assumption not met in this 
case. Therefore, the model was run against a rare events logit model. As you can see in 
Table 7 the results are largely similar, weakening my fears about the inapplicability of the 
standard logistic model.
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Table 7: Probability of Facing a Primary Challenger: 2000 and 2002 elections
Variable Logit Model
Coefficient (Robust S.E.)
Rare Events Logit Model
Coefficient (Robust S.E.)
Party/Majority -.18(.23) -.17(.23)
Residence -.29(.19) -.28(.19)
Terms -.01(.02) -.01(.02)
Ideological Extremity -1.53(.64)** -1.47(.63)**
Power Committee -.05(.19) -.05(.19)
Money Raised    .00(.00)    .00(.00)
Age    .00(.00)    .00(.01)
Personal Vote -.01(.01) -.01(.01)
Partisan Strength    .04(.01)***    .04(.01)***
Ballot Restrictive State -.84(.31)*** -.80(.31)**
Blanket Primary State -.13(.18)    .13(.18)
Redistricting -.01(.01)* -.01(.01)*
Scandal    .73(.72)    .75(.71)
Constant    .57(.85)    .52(.84)
N 767 767
Pseudo R2    .05
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Table 7 shows similar results to Table 3, with ideological extremity depressing the 
chances of facing a primary opponent. The weak scandal variable drops out of significance 
while redistricting retains a small effect. Both partisan strength and ballot restrictive state 
have a large amount of power over the probability of facing a partisan challenger. It seems 
both in terms of number of challengers and probability of facing a challenger of any kind, 
the best predicting variables are district factors (partisanship, state, redistricting) rather 
than factors controllable by the member.
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Table 8: Discrete Change (Dichotomous Model)
Variable Iteration 1 
(Min-Max)
Iteration 1 (0-
1)
Iteration 2 
(Min-Max)
Iteration 2 (0-
1)
Party/Majority -.031 -.034 -.026 -.029
Residence -.050 -.058 -.044 -.052
Terms -.039 -.002 -.028 -.001
Ideological 
Extremity
-.299 -.265 -.221 -.199
Power 
Committee
-.001 -.001 -.008 -.008
Money Raised  .015  .000  .011  .000
Age  .016  .000  .012  .000
Personal Vote -.080 -.002 -.059 -.001
Partisan 
Strength
 .507  .006  .411  .005
Ballot 
Restrictive 
State
-.123 -.123 -.149 -.149
Blanket 
Primary State
 .024  .024  .017  .017
Redistricting -.184 -.003 -.146 -.002
Scandal  .158  .158 .078  .078
N 767 767 767 767
Discrete change was computed with continuous variables held to their means, while all 
dichotomous variables were held to their minimum (iteration 1) or maximum (iteration 
2) values. Dichotomous variables are listed in italics for reader convenience.
Given the similarity between the logistic and rare events logistic results, the additional 
analysis was run on the logistic model for convenience. Table 8 shows similar, if 
somewhat muted, results from the previous discrete change analysis. Partisan strength of 
the district continues to dominate the landscape with smaller effects for ideological 
extremity and much smaller effects for ballot restrictive states. Part of the reason for the 
weaker effects in this analysis is the fact that the dichotomous model has lost some of the 
information from the previous model (i.e. places with three challengers are now considered 
to be the same as places with one challenger). Looking at Table 9, we see the strongest 
effect again for ballot restrictive state and ideological extremity (a dichotomous and short 
range variable respectively). Partisan strength looks smaller by comparison but that stems 
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from the range of the variable. Imagine as district goes from partisan strength of 1 (very 
unsafe) to 10 (fairly safe), the chance of a partisan challenger increases by 43%. Scandal 
looks very powerful but the result is statistically non-significant in the logistics regression. 
Table 10 presents the fit statistics for this model, again, an underwhelming illustration of 
the difficulty in gaining traction on the issue of all challengers. 
Table 9: Percent Change in Odds Ratio 
(Dichotomous Model)
Variable Percent Change
Party/Majority -16.2%
Residence -25.3%
Terms -1%
Ideological Extremity -78.2%
Power Committee -5.3%
Money Raised      0.0%
Age      0.2%
Personal Vote -0.8%
Partisan Strength      4.3%
Ballot Restrictive State -56.7%
Blanket Primary State     13.5%
Redistricting -1%
Scandal    107.3%
N 767
Table 10: Model Fit: All Challengers (Dichotomous)
McFadden’s R2 0.046
Likelihood Ration R2 0.046
McKelvey Zavoina R2 0.086
Aldrich-Nelson R2 0.045
Wald Test R2 0.065
The previous analysis has dealt with all primary challengers, whether quality or 
symbolic. At this stage we will examine only the quality challengers. Theory predicts that 
this group is more likely to engage in strategic action. Since the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, this model will run with logistic regression. This data suffers from the same 
problems as the previous model, only to a more extreme extent, necessitating the use of a 
rare events model. 
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Table 11: Probability of Facing a Quality Primary Challengers 2000 and 2002 
elections
Variable Logit Model
Coefficient (Robust S.E.)
Rare Events Model
Coefficient (Robust S.E.)
Party/Majority -.52(.47) -.49(.46)
Residence -.69(.52) -.58(.52)
Terms    .01(.04)    .02(.03)
Ideological Extremity -5.12(1.76)*** -4.76(1.73)***
Power Committee -1.55(.41)*** -1.38(.41)***
Money Raised -.00(.00) -.00(.00)
Age -.04(.02)* -.03(.02)*
Personal Vote -.02(.02) -.02(.02)
Partisan Strength    .08(.02)***    .08(.02)***
Ballot Restrictive State    .46(.28)    .48(.28)*
Blanket Primary State    .93(.24)***    .91(.24)***
Redistricting    .01(.01)    .01(.01)
Scandal  1.96(.86)**  2.05(.85)**
Constant  1.59(1.79)  1.39(1.76)
N 767 767
Pseudo R2  .16
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Looking at the results in Table 11, we observe a considerable amount of strategic 
behavior going on among quality challengers. Potential candidates clearly survey the 
environment looking for an opening before entering a primary contest. Similarly, for all 
candidates, the partisanship of the district plays a role in the possibility of facing a 
challenge. If a quality challenger believes that they may face another difficult race in 
November, then they are unlikely to mount a campaign against an incumbent.  Ideological 
moderation is also a potential sign that the member may be out of step with views of the 
primary electorate.**
Unlike symbolic or protest challengers, quality challengers will be far more likely to 
view scandal or potential scandal as a sign that the incumbent is vulnerable. Such 
candidates will also be far less likely to challenge a member of a power committee, since 
**
 For a practical example of this phenomena at the Senate level, look at the current Rhode Island Republican 
primary. 
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such a member is likely to have greater potential resources, both among potential donor 
and national party elites. 
Blanket primary states seem to attract a greater number of potential quality challengers, 
while ballot restrictive states still have a minor positive effect. One possible explanation is 
that the free-for-all nature of the blanket primary leads possible candidates to conclude that 
their chances for upset are higher. That quality challengers are more likely in ballot 
restrictive states should not be a surprising result, since the institutional barriers will be 
less relevant to such candidates. The weak negative effect of age suggests that possible 
candidates will be more likely to challenge younger members, regardless of the number of 
terms served. 
Table 12: Discrete Change (Quality Challengers Dichotomous Model)
Variable Iteration 
1 (Min-
Max)
Iteration 
1 (0-1)
Iteration 2 
(Min-
Max)
Iteration 2 (0-1)
Party/Majority -.016 -.026 -043. -.063
Residence -.020 -.037 -.061 -.101
Terms  .014  .001  .024  .001
Ideological 
Extremity
-.271 -.269 -.401 -.398
Power 
Committee
-.032 -.032 -.195 -.195
Money Raised -.083 -.000 -.141 -.000
Age -.082 -.006 -.135 -.008
Personal Vote -.042 -.001 -.071 -.002
Partisan Strength  .417  .002  .561  .003
Ballot Restrictive 
State
 .022  .022  .025  .025
Blanket Primary 
State
 .056  .056  .042  .042
Redistricting  .025  .000  .043  .000
Scandal  .192  .192  .061  .061
N 767 767 767 767
Discrete change was computed with continuous variables held to their means, while 
all dichotomous variables were held to their minimum (iteration 1) or maximum 
(iteration 2) values. Dichotomous variables are listed in italics for reader 
convenience.
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Looking at the variables that were significant in the previous model, we see similar 
results to the previous change analysis. Partisan strength again looks to be the dominate 
predictor, with ideological extremity also showing a powerful effect. Whether or not the 
member sits on a power committee plays a smaller role in depressing the chance of a 
quality challenger. Interestingly, when one moves from the dichotomous variables being 
held at their minimum to their maximum, the effect of the power committee variable 
triples. Clearly, the effect of sitting on a power committee varies greatly with other factors. 
Living in a blanket primary state has a small positive effect on the probability of facing a 
quality challenger. Unlike the power committee variable, this effect is largely similar in the 
two iterations. Scandal has a positive effect but not one nearly as a large as partisan 
strength or ideological extremity. The borderline predictor, age, has a small negative effect,
but the result is not significant. 
Moving the percent change analysis in table 13, a different relationship seems to 
emerge. Congressmen can largely reduce their chances of facing a quality challenger by 
moving to the ideological extreme. Being put on a power committee also has a large role in 
reducing the chance of such challenges. Partisan strength is almost doubly important to 
quality challengers as it is to all challengers. Using the previous example, as a district goes 
from partisan strength of 1 (unsafe) to 10 (fairly safe), the member would be 85% more 
likely to face a quality challenger. Living in a blanket primary state also significantly 
increases the probability of facing a quality challenger. The most powerful effect comes 
from the scandal variable, which has percent change four times larger than any other
variable. Clearly staying out of ethical trouble is one of the best things a member can do to 
avoid quality challengers. 
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Table 13: Percent Change in Odds Ratio 
(Quality Challengers Dichotomous Model)
Variable Percent Change
Party/Majority -40.3%
Residence -49.8%
Terms     1.5%
Ideological Extremity -99.4%
Power Committee -78.9%
Money Raised -0.1%
Age -3.5%
Personal Vote -2.4%
Partisan Strength      8.5%
Ballot Restrictive State    58.3%
Blanket Primary State  152.3%
Redistricting      1.0%
Scandal  613.2%
N 767
According to the standard model fit criteria, the model does far better at predicting 
quality challengers than predicting all challengers. While the pseudo R2 values are clearly 
not enormous, given the peculiarities of trying to predict the probability of someone taking 
an enormous political gamble, they are a satisfying result. Clearly, a rational political elite 
will not undertake a campaign against an incumbent lightly, so there are many factors and 
combinations of factors that may come into play. 
Table 14: Model Fit: Quality Challengers (Dichotomous)
McFadden’s R2 0.161
Likelihood Ration R2 0.057
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 0.382
Aldrich-Nelson R2 0.055
Wald Test R2 0.132
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
These results paint an interesting picture about the contexts that lead to primary contests 
for incumbents. It is obvious that ballot access rules play a role in whether an incumbent 
faces a quality or symbolic/protest challenger. For both types of challengers, the partisan 
strength of the district plays an important part, with safer seats logically being more sought 
after. Interestingly, getting a seat in the majority party does not seem to have an effect. 
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When dealing with quality challengers, membership on a power committee seems to 
discourage primary contests. Overall, the model dealing  with quality challengers is clearly
superior to those that include all challengers. That result is unsurprising given the fact that 
the larger sample includes many candidates that may not be behaving strategically at all. 
From the point of view of the incumbent trying to hold onto their seat, there is a bit of 
helpful information. While there is little that a member can do to ensure being placed on a 
power committee or having the state legislature redraw boundaries in an advantageous 
way, the member should take care to avoid scandal or the appearance of scandal. Beyond 
that, the member needs to place themselves carefully on the ideological spectrum. Clearly 
moving too far to the extreme risks serious challenger from the opposing party, but moving 
too close to the center may lead to a primary challenge. The strategic incumbent should 
work to find a position between the ideal points of the primary and general election 
constituencies. This result is consistent with the frequent criticisms of the median voter 
theorem, while offering an empirical illustration of competing constituencies within a 
given district. 
While this research has offered some new insight into the specific contextual factors that 
may lead to primary challenges, it suffers from some limitations. For instance the sample, 
while including a decent number of cases only includes two congressional cycles. In the 
future, this research could be extended to include a greater number of years. It is important 
to analyze whether the results above are only contemporary or are lasting  Additionally, 
while scandal is including in the model, the measure undoubtedly underestimates the 
number of accusations of scandals due to the institutional stigma against bringing charges 
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on fellow members. Future research might find a better operationalization of scandal, one 
which both casts a wider net as well as captures the gradations of scandal. 
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